Indiana Law Journal
Volume 23

Issue 3

Article 6

Spring 1948

Physician-Patient Privilege-Waiver in Deed and Will Contests

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons, and the Evidence Commons

Recommended Citation
(1948) "Physician-Patient Privilege-Waiver in Deed and Will Contests," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 23 : Iss. 3
, Article 6.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol23/iss3/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

19483

NOTES

the case should be limited to its facts, and that any expansion
of its principle to the contract field generally would be
unwarranted.32 But the familiar tendency of a principle to
expand itself to the limit of its logic cannot be ignored. The
possibility of such an expansion makes Bruce's Juices, Inc. v.
American Can Co. a case of considerable significance to both
lawyers33 and legislators.-

EVIDENCE
PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGEWAIVER IN DEED AND WILL CONTESTS
The heirs of a deceased grantor sued the grantees to set
aside a deed on the grounds of fraud, undue influence, and unsoundness of mind. The heirs called two physicians to testify
to the physical and mental condition of the grantor. The
grantees objected to this testimony on the grounds that a physician is incompetent to testify as to any information acquired
in his professional capacity while attending or treating a
patient. The trial court admitted the testimony of the physicians over this objection. On appeal, the Indiana Appellate
Court reversed, holding that the deceased grantor's privilege
of objecting to the admission of testimony of physicians who
attended him cannot be waived over the objections of the
grantees who seek to sustain the deed. Stayner v. Nye, 76
N.E.2d 855 (Ind. App. 1948).
32.

Lockhart, "Violation of Anti-Trust Laws as a Defense in Civil
Actions," 31 Minn. L. Rev. 507, 548 n.215 (1947).
33. At time of writing there has been at least one reported attempt
(unsuccessful) to use the doctrine of the instant case to overcome
a defense of illegality in a contract action. A seller who charged
more than the OPA ceiling price brought suit to recover damages
for buyer's failure to pay for goods sold. Defendant pleaded illegality ,and plaintiff urged the Bruce's Juices case on the Court.
In refusing recovery, the Court said: " . . . the fact, if it be a
fact that the Supreme Court of the United States has held that
a seiler's violation of another statute-the Robinson-Patman Price
Discrimination Act--does not render unenforceable notes given for
the purchase price of goods . . . does not give a N.Y. court leave
to ignore or disregard the specific decision of [the New York]
Court of Appeals with reference to the effect of violation of the
identical statute here involved." Government of French Republic
v. Cabot, 16 U.S.L.Week 2240 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 25, 1947).
34. The refusal of courts to enforce contracts involving violation of a
statute is often one of the most effective of the available sanctions.
If those who draft statutes wish to avail themselves of this sanction, it appears, as a result of the principal case, even more clearly
than before, that they must expressly provide for it. Not even
addition of criminal sanction will assure the result.
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In the earlier case of Towles v. McCurdy1 where the controversy was among heirs and devisees in a will contest, the
Court had held that for "obvious reasons" neither set may
waive the patient's privilege over the objections of the other
set who seek to sustain the will. In the instant case, the Court
found that there was no reason why the rule announced in the
Towles case was not equally applicable to deed contests. The
problem presented by these two cases is to determine what
those "obvious reasons" are that prevent heirs from waiving
their deceased ancestor's privilege in will and deed contests.
At common law, a physician was a competent witness
to testify as to facts concerning the mental and physical condition of a patient. Furthermore, a patient had no privilege
of objecting to a full disclosure of such facts when his physician was called upon to testify in court.2 The medical profession first succeeded in persuading the New York legislature3 that the same rule of public policy by means of which
the common law protected professional confidences existing
between a client and his attorney should be extended to the
relation between a patient and his physician.4 Modern authorities agree that the reasons for the privilege are unsound and that there is little or no excuse for its existence.1. 163 Ind. 12, 71 N.E. 129 (1904).
2.

3.

4.

5.

Myers v. State, 192 Ind. 592, 599, 137 N.E. 547, 549 (1922) ; William
Laurie Co. v. McCullough, 174 Ind. 477, 488, 90 N.E. 1014, 1018
(1910); Towles v. McCurdy, 163 Ind. 12, 14, 71 N.E. 129, 130
(1904). 8 Wigmore, "Evidence" §2380 (3d ed. 1940).
The patient's privilege was first created by statute in New York
in 1828. After numerous amendments, the statute now provides in
substance that a person duly authorized to practice medicine or
dentistry, or a nurse, shall not be allowed to disclose any information which he acquired in attending a patient in a professional
capacity, and which was necessary to enable him to act in that
capacity. N.Y. Civ. Proc. Act §352. In a later section, provisions
are made for waiver. However, a personal representative nay
waive except as to confidential communications and facts which
might tend to disgrace the memory of the patient, or unless the
personal representative has interests adverse to the patient's estate.
If the validity of the patient's last will is in question, however, the
executor, named in the will, the surviving spouse, any heir at law,
next of kin, or any other party in interest may waive. N.Y. Civ.
Prac. Act §354.
Masonic Mutual Benefit Assoc. v. Beck, 77 Ind. 203, 210 (1881).
For a summary of the purpose and policies behind the privilege,
see Studebaker v. Faylor, 52 Ind. App. 171, 172, 98 N.E. 318, 319
(1912); Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis R. Co. v.
O'Conner, 171 Ind. 686, 85 N.E. 969 (1908); Penn. Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Wiler, 100 Ind. 92, 100 (1885); 8 Wigmore, "Evidence" §2380a (3d ed. 1940).
See 8 Wigmore, "Evidence" §2380a (3d ed. 1940) and commentaries
cited in n.3 therein.
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However, Indiana was among those states which adopted the
privilege by statute, following the lead of New York. Like
those of a few other jurisdictions, the Indiana statute is
written in terms of competency, 6 not in terms of privilege, and
perhaps much of the difficulty in applying it arises from this
unfortunate terminology. However, the Indiana courts have
declared, in spite of its wording, that the statute creates no
6.

id. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §2-1714 provides in part: "The fol-

lowing persons shall not be competent witnesses: . . . Third.

Attorneys as to confidential communications made to them in the
course of their professional business, and as to advice given in such
cases. Fourth. Physicians, as to matter communicated to them, as
such, by patients, in the course of their professional business, or
advice given in such cases. . . . . Courts have, in most instances,
liberally construed the fourth clause of this statute in that all information acquired by the physician in the course of his professional business falls within the privilege. Thus facts concerning the
patient's mental condition are equally protected, even though the
physician may have been called to remedy physical ailments. Towles
v. McCurdy, supra n.2; Heuston v. Simpson, 115 Ind. 62, 63, 17
N.E. 261, 262 (1889) ; Masonic Mutual Benefit Assoc. v. Beck, supra
n.4. At other times, however, the courts have declared that the
the statute under discussion is in derogation of the common law
and should not be enlarged by construction. Myers v. State, 192
Ind. 592, 599, 137 N.E. 547, 550 (1922); Bower v. Bower, 142 Ind.
194, 202, 41 N.E. 523, 525 (1895). And see William Laurie Co.
v. McCullough, 174 Ind. 477, 483, 488, 90 N.E. 1014, 1016, 1018
(1910) where the physician-patient privilege was both liberally
and strictly construed for different purposes.
For purposes of comparison, the California statute which is
representative of those in several other jurisdictions, provides in
part: "There are particular relations in which it is the policy of
the law to encourage confidence and to preserve it inviolate; therefore, a person cannot be examined as a witness in the following
cases . . . 4. Physician and patient. A licensed physician or surgeon cannot, without the consent of patient, be examined in a
civil action, as to any information acquired in attending the patient, which was necessary to enable him to prescribe or act for
the patient; provided, however, that either before or after probate,
upon the contest of any will executed, or claimed to have been executed, by such patient, or after the death of such patient, in any
action involving the validity of any instrument executed, or claimed
to have been executed, by him conveying or transferring any real
or personal property, such physician or surgeon may testify to the
mental condition of said patient and in so testifying may disclose
information acquired by him concerning said deceased which was
necessary to enable him to prescribe or act for such deceased; . .
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1941) §1881. The States which have
statutes similar to that of California have not, however, adopted
the proviso clause. Those States and their statutes are: Idaho Code
(1932) §16-203; Mont. Rev. Codes (Anderson & MIcFarland, 1935)
§10536; Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer, 1929) §31-0106; Ore. Comp.
Law Ann.
§3-104;
S.D.Rev.
CodeStat.
(1939)
Utah 1932)
Code
Ann.
(1943) (1940)
§104-49-3;
Wash.
Ann.§36.0101;
(Remington,
§1214. The statutes similar to that of Indiana making physicians
"incompetent°" to testify are: Kan. Gen. Stat. (Cormick, 1935)
§60-2805; Muo. Rev. Stat. (1939) §1895; 0kla, Stat. (1941) tit. 12,
§385. Nevertheless, both Kansas and Missouri Courts allow waiver
by heirs. See n.23 infra.
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absolute incompetency; that it confers a privilege upon pa-

tients for whose benefit it was enacted either to claim or
waive it; and that if the patient does not claim the privilege
the physician cannot refuse to testify7
A review of the decisions involving an application of this

statute discloses that the foregoing interpretation is always
applied when the patient is living and a party to the suit.8 By
analogy with other privileges, the patient's privilege does not
die with the patient, but survives him to be claimed or waived
by those persons who are regarded as standing in his place."
Thus in life insurance cases it has been held that the widow
or the daughter, as beneficiary under the policy, stands in
the place of the deceased patient for the purpose of claiming
or waiving his privilege. 10 Also in will contests it has been
consistently held that the executor or administrator can claim
or waive the patient's privilege in order to protect the interests of the patient's estate.1 It can be said, therefore, that
7.

Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis R. Co. v. O'Conner,
171 Ind. 686, 689, 85 W.E. 969, 970 (1908); Penn. Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Wiler, 100 Ind. 92, 100 (1885).
8. In actions to recover damages for personal injuries, for example,
the courts have consistently regarded the statute as creating a
privilege and not a rule of absolute disqualification. Thus the
person for whose benefit the statute was enacted must claim its
protection. Waiver, on the other hand, may be express or implied.
See Pittsburgh R. Co. v. O'Connor, supra n.4 (waiver by failing to
claim at a prior trial); Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v.
McClure, 108 Ind. App. 253, 24 N.E.2d 78 (1940) (waiver by opening up the issue in calling one of several physicians to testify as
to the fact in controversy); cf. Schlarb v. Henderson, 211 Ind. 1,
4 N.E.2d 205 (1936). And in suits against the physician for malpractice, it seems that the privilege is waived as to all matters
connected with the treatment of the ailment in which defendant
physician participated. Lane v. Boicourt 128 Ind. 420, 27 N.E.
1111 (1890); Becknell v. Hosier, 10 Ind. App. 5, 37 N.E. 580
(1893). In the latter case, the court applied by analogy the rule of
those cases where a client sues his attorney for imalpractice, citing
the early case of Nave v. Baird, 12 Ind. 318 (1859).
9. Pence v. Myers, 180 Ind. 282, 101 N.E. 716, (1913); Penn. Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Wiler, 100 Ind. 92, 101 (1885); Masonic
Mutual Benefit Assoc. v. Beck, 77 Ind. 203, 210 (1881). See also
8 Wigmore, "Evidence" §2387 (3d ed. 1940).
10. Penn. Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Wiler, supra n.4; Masonic
Mutual Benefit Assoc. v. Beck, supra n.4 (widow allowed to claim
the deceased patient's privilege in both cases); Excelsior Mutual
Aid Assoc. v. Riddle, 91 Ind. 84 (1883) (daughter entitled to claim).
11. Sager v. Moltz, 80 Ind. App. 122, 139 N.E. 687 (1923) (will contest; executor allowed to waive the privilege in order to show mental capacity of the decedent over the objections of the only-heir at
law who desired to claim it); Studebaker v. Faylor, 52 Ind. App.
171, 98 N.E. 318 (1912) (deed contest; administrator was present
in court but was not a party to the suit, and he expressly waived
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for most purposes the statute creates a true privilege which
must be claimed in order to secure its protection.2 Unlike
rules of absolute disqualification, the privilege, which is a
rule of conditional exclusion, may be exercised only by the
person for whose benefit it exists or by a person whom courts
regard as standing in his place. If no such person is party to
the suit or present in the court, there is no one available to
exercise the privilegelu
the privilege. Heirs who sought to have the deed set aside due to
grantor's mental incapacity also expressly waived the privilege.
Grantees, however, had failed to object to the testimony of the physicians at a prior trial. It was held that all persons in whom
there could be a right to insist on the privilege had either expressly
waived it, or had impliedly done so by standing by and allowing
testimony to be given). Morris v. Morris, 119 Ind. 341, 21 N.E.
918 (1889) (will contest; administrator with will annexed allowed
to waive the decedent's privilege over the objections of the widow
who sought to claim it). See also Brackney v. Fogle, 156 Ind.
535, 60 N.E. 303 (1901) (administrator successfully claimed the
privilege when heirs sought to waive it in a will contest); cf.
Heaston v. Krieg, 167 Ind. 101, 77 N.E. 805 (1906) (suit to revoke
the probate of a will and to substitute a second will. The executor
of the first will was not allowed to waive the privilege in order
to show the mental capacity of the testatrix with regard to the
second will. It appeared that the executor's wife was a beneficiary under the first will). And see Scott v. Smith, 171 Ind. 453,
85 N.E. 774 (1908) (administrator not allowed to waive the privilege for the sole purpose of resisting an application to remove
him).
The Court in the instant case cited the latter two cases in support of the proposition that the personal representative may waive
in order to protect the interests of the patient's estate only. See
instant case at 855. Quaere, while the deed or will may be prima
facie the patient's valid act, Heaston v. Krieg, supra, it would seem
to be equally within the patient's interests and hence the interests
of his estate to find out whether or not the instrument was in fact
valid. If in fact the patient lacked the necessary mental capacity
to execute a valid deed or will, it is manifest that the persons who
were not intended by the patient to take are allowed to prevail over
the natural objects of his bounty. See Winters v. Winters, 102
Iowa 55, 71 N.W. 184 (1897).
12. See 8 Wigmore, "Evidence" §2175 (3d ed. 1940), where the author
groups rules of exclusion into two categories: absolute and conditional. "The former class of prohibitions are enforced by the
Court like other rules of Evidence; the latter are applied only on
demand of the person who is supposed to be affected in his interests
by the extrinsic policy in question and to be protected by the
rule from an injury to that interest." Privileges are members of
the latter class.
13. See 8 Wigmore, "Evidence' §§2175, 2327, 2388 (3d ed. 1940). In
discussing the attorney-client privilege, in §2327 the author points
out: "There is no analogy between a rule of conditional exclusion
in the nature of a privilege and an absolute rule of disqualification.
Yet the common juxtaposition of the two classes of rules in statutory enactments-due in part to the indiscriminate use of the
term "competent," long ago denounced by Bentham-has from
time to time made it necessary for the Bench to correct this elementary misunderstanding on the part of the Bar." In discussing
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It is doubtful, however, that the decisions in the instant
case and the Towles case can be explained in terms of "privilege." If it is a privilege with which we are dealing, it
would seem that the- right to claim necessarily carries with it
an equal right to waive. 14 But in the instant case and in the
Towles case heirs were denied the right to waive; this would
indicate that they likewise could not claim the privilege as
such had they desired to do so. It hardly can be supposed that
devisees or grantees are entitled to claim when the heirs
cannot.15 Nevertheless, devisees in the Towles case and grantees in the instant case were successful in excluding the testimony of physicians who attended the deceased patient. It
seems, therefore, that these decisions adopt a construction of
the statute which renders physicians absolutely incompetent
to testify as to the mental and physical condition of their
patients; and that by analogy with other rules of absolute dis-

14.

15.

the physician-patient privilege with regard to the problem of waiver by conduct, in §2388 the author indicates that the same observation applies. That the distinctions between the claim of a
privilege and an objection to incompetent testimony is of importance not only as the subject of academic debate, but also as a
practical consideration in law suits, is illustrated by the decisions
in the instant case and in the Towles case. While the Court in
both cases talks in terms of privilege, it seems difficult to explain
the results in such terms. See also 8 Wigmore, "Evidence"
§§2386, 2321, 2196 (3d ed. 1940). The patient's privilege belongs
to him as a patient and not as a party to the suit, and if he is
present in court he may claim the privilege.
It is discretionary with the patient as to whether he will claim or
waive. There seems to be no reason why the person who stands in
the place of a deceased patient should not have the same discretion.
But the courts have held that a personal representative may claim
or waive in order to protect the interests of the patient's estate
only, n.11 supra; and some courts have even enunciated the proposition that only the person who seeks to uphold the instrument
may exercise that patient's privilege to claim or-waive. Heaston
v. Krieg, 167 Ind. 101, 118, 77 N.E. 805, 810 (1906); Sager v.
Moltz, 80 Ind. App. 122, 129, 139 N.E. 687, 690 (1923). It would
appear that the courts are assuming conclusively that if the patient were alive he would exercise his right to claim or waive m
order to protect the prima facie validity of the instrument contested. But quaere, in the case of a personal representative does
it necessarily follow that protecting the validity of the contested
instrument benefits the estate. Cf. comment in n.11 supra. See
also Platz, "The Competency of Attorneys and Physicians to Disclose Privileged Communications in Testamentary Cases," 1939
Wis. L. Rev. 335, 356.
This would be true whether or not the devisees or grantees were
also heirs or were strangers. In Studebaker v. Faylor, 52 Ind. App.
171, 173, 174, 98 N.E. 318, 319 (1912) it was indicated in dicta that
grantees (and no doubt devisees) are not entitled to claim the patient's privilege because such persons cannot be regarded as personal representatives of the patient.
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qualification, any party to the suit may successfully object.
The objection to the evidence in the instant case may be considered therefore as an objection to incompetent evidence and
not as claiming a privilege. If this is one of the several possible explanations of those otherwise inarticulate "obvious
reasons," it appears that the Court has departed from precedent without bothering to overrule or distinguish previous decisions supporting a contrary interpretation of the statute,
and hence a contrary result. 6
But while some decisions support a different result, the
rule of the instant case and the Towles case, which is applicable only to deed and will contests, is also supported by precedent. '7 Perhaps, then, there is something distinctive about
deed and will contests which justifies different treatment.
No doubt it is extremely unpleasant to hear persons, all of
whom are claiming under the deceased patient, arguing in
public about his mental capacity. But since the courts permit
heirs, devisees, and grantees to voice their personal opinions
as to the deceased patient's sanity,', it is doubtful that this
foregoing consideration has induced the courts to exclude
testimony of physicians. So while the court and jury must
listen to this often undependable testimony of lay witnesses,
the decedent's physician who might be able to qualify as an
expert must sit idly biy and be a witness only to the suppression of truth rather than to its ascertainment.
Perhaps the remnants of feudal laws of property arise
to plague us here. Real property, under Indiana law, passes
directly to the heirs,' 9 while personal property passes to the
16.

A contrary interpretation, and hence a contrary result, is supported by those cases which not only explain the conclusion in terms
of privilege, but also apply the rationale of privilege in the process. See n.8 and n.11. A waiver by heirs is supported by the
life insurance cases, n.10 supra. That in such cases the privilege
should not exist at all is supported by analogy with the cases involving similar controversies where the attorney-client privilege is
invoked but held not to apply. See n.26 infra.
17. Pence v. Myers, 180 Ind. 282, 101 N.E. 716 (1913); Gurley v.
Park, 135 Ind. 440, 35 N.E. 279 (1893). See also Heuston v. Simpson, 115 Ind. 62, 17 N.E. 261 (1888).
18. Hoppes v. Steed, 86 Ind. App. 201, 156 N.E. 574 (1927); Davis v.
Babb, 190 Ind. 173, 125 N.E. 403 (1920); Burkhart v. Gladish,
123 Ind. 337, 24 N.E. 118 (1889); Staser v. Hogan, 120 Ind. 207,
21 N.E. 911 (1889); Lamb v. Lamb, 105 Ind. 456, 5 N.E. 171

(1885).

19.

Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §6-2301; Gavit, "Indiana Law, Future Interests, Wills, Descent" §137 (1934).
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executor or administrator of the decedent's estate.20 So, in
actions by heirs against legatees, no doubt the executor or
administrator has a duty to claim or waive the privilege as
the situation may require in order to protect the interests of
the patient's estate. But on the other hand if the suit involves
real property and the controversy is among heirs and devisees
or among heirs and grantees, it would seem that the heirs
would have a sufficient standing to claim or waive the privilege. Under the rule of the instant case and the Towles case,
if the testator or grantor actually lacked the mental capacity
necessary to execute a valid deed or will, persons who may
not be the natural objects of his bounty are allowed to take
under an invalid instrument. Furthermore, even if an instrument is valid, the law favors a construction which vests
the property in the natural objects of the decedent's bounty. 21
How then can these decisions be justified when one possible
result is to assist a grantee or devisee, (who may not be a
heir), to sustain an instrument the validity of which is in
controversy?
It has been seen that heir-beneficiaries are regarded as
standing in the place of the patient for purpose of claiming
or waiving his privilege in life insurance cases. 22 It seems to
follow that heirs should be entitled to claim or waive the privilege in deed and will contests. Presumptively, at least, an
heir has more interest in protecting the patient's reputation
than does a devisee or grantee, and in many jurisdictions
where the privilege exists heirs are entitled to waive. 23 But
20.
21.

22.

23.

Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §6-701 (executor or administrator
responsible for personal property but not for real property) ; Gavit,
op. cit. supra, n.19.
Ames v. Conry, 87 Ind. App. 149, 156, 165 N.E. 435, 438 (1927);
Oliphant v. Humphrey, 193 Ind. 656, 660, 141 N.E. 517, 518 (1923) ;
Aspy v. Lewis, 152 Ind. 493, 495, 52 N.E. 756, 757 (1899); Crew
v. Dixon, 129 Ind. 85, 90, 27 N.E. 728, 730 (1891).
See life insurance cases cited n.10 supra, where widows were allowed to claim the privilege being regarded as standing in the place
of the deceased patient for that purpose. There is no doubt that a
surviving spouse is a statutory heir in Indiana. Ind. Stat. Ann.
(Burns, 1933) §§6-2312 (every rule of descent and distribution
prescribed in the Act is subject to the provisions made for a surviving husband or wife), 6-2313, 6-2321, 6-2324.
See Davis v.
Kelley, 179 Ind. 13, 16, 97 N.E. 336, 337 (1912).
While the devisees or grantees may also be heirs in fact, for purposes of the suit they are present in the capacity as devisees or
grantees and not as heirs. See Bruington v. Wagner, 100 Kan. 10,
164 Pac. 1057 (1917). That in many jurisdictions where the privilege exists, heirs are entitled to waive, see: Schornick v. Schornick,
25 Ariz. 563, 220 Pac. 397 (1923) ; In re Shapter's Estate, 35 Colo.
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if the court does not allow the persons designated as devisees
and grantees to claim the privilege, there may be a practical
difficulty when both parties to a will or deed contest are
heirs of the patient. There would seem to be little or nothing
to justify a court in prefering one set of heirs by allowing
them to waive the privilege over the objections of the other
set who seek to claim it.
Perhaps the best solution to the problem is to apply the
rationale of privilege to the statutory provision under discussion and to refuse to permit either party to claim the privilege in deed and will contests or to hold that in such cases
the privilege does not apply. At one time there was adequate
support for the' foregoing solution. The physician-patient
privilege has always been regarded as being essentially the
same as the attorney-client privilege, and the Indiana courts
have frequently drawn analogies from one privilege to the
other.24 In Kern v. Kern2 it was held that where the controversy is among heirs and devisees in a will contest, the attorney-client privilege does not apply. The Court declared that
"In such cases it is said that the very foundation upon which
the rule proceeds seems to be wanting."26 By analogy, the
patient's privilege should not apply to will contests or deed
7
contests.

2

578, 85 Pac. 688 (1905) ; Sprouse v. Magee, 46 Idaho 622, 269 Pac.
993 (1928); Boyles v. Cora, 232 Iowa 822, 6 N.W.2d 412 (1942);
Winters v. Winters, 102 Iowa 55, 71 N.W. 184 (1892); Gorman v.
Hickey, 145 Kan. 54, 64 P.2d 587 (1937); Thompson v. Ish, 99 Mo.
160, 12 S.W. 510 (1889); In re Gray, 88 Neb. 835, 130 N.W. 746
(1911) ; Grieve v. Howard, 54 Utah 225, 180 Pac. 423 (1919) ; In re
Thomas Estate, 165 Wash. 42, 4 P.2d 837 (1931).
24. Myers v. State, 192 Ind. 592, 601, 137 N.E. 547, 550 (1922) ; Springer v. Byrum, 137 Ind. 15, 36 N.E. 361 (1894) ; Penn. Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. WViler, 100 Ind. 92, 101 (1885); Masonic Mutual
Benefit Association v. Beck, 77 Ind. 203 (1881).
25. 154 Ind. 29, 55 N.E. 1004 (1900).
26. Id. at 154 Ind. 29, 33, 55 N.E. 1004, 1006 (1900). The reasons
given by the Court in Russell v. Jackson, 9 Hare 387, 68 Eng. Rep.
558 (1851) (cited by the Indiana Court in the Kern case, supra
n.25) is that where the question is which of two parties, both
claiming under the client, should get the property, it would be arbitrary to hold that the property and the client's privilege belong
to one party and not the other.
27. However, the same Court in Brackney v. Fogle, 156 Ind. 535, 60
N.E. 303 (1901) held that the analogy is improper and that the
rule announced in the Kern case, supra n.25, had no application
to will contests among heirs and devisees where the physicianpatient privilege is invoked, even when both parties claim under
the patient. Counsel submitted the Kern case to the Court in
Towles v. McCurdy, supra n.1, but the Brackney case was followed
and the rule was adopted that in will contests where the controversy is among heirs and devisees, for "obvious reasons" neither
set may waive the privilege over the objections of the other set
who seek to sustain the will.
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It is submitted that the rule announced in Towles v. McCurdy and adopted by the Court in the instant case should
not be applied in the future to either will or deed contests
where the controversy is among heirs and devisees or grantees. The rule certainly is not necessary to protect the reputation of the patient for whose benefit the statute was enacted, for proof that the patient lacked the mental capacity to
execute a valid deed or will is not proof of insanity.2 8 There
seems to be nothing to prevent a court from requiring a person who claims the privilege to show that if the physician's
testimony is given, the patient's reputation might be harmed.
As in other rules of exclusion, the admissibility of the physician's testimony would then depend on the sound discretion
of the court.29 Thus protection to the patient afforded by
the statute would be preserved, and at the same time the
court and jury would have a better chance to learn the truth
about the fact in controversy. But if rational symmetry of
the law relating to privileged communications is desirable,
then it is preferable for courts to apply the rule of Kern v.
Kern and hold by analogy with the attorney-client privilege
that in deed or will contests among heirs and grantees or
devisees, the patient's privilege cannot be claimed by either
30
party.
28.

Blough v. Parry, 144 Ind. 463, 489, 40 N.E. 70, 43 N.E. 560, 563
(1895); and see Harrison v. Bishop, 131 Ind. 161, 30 N.E. 1069
(1891) (while the adjudication of mental unsoundness in a proceeding for the appointment of a guardian conclusively establishes
the fact of his inability to manage his estate, it does not necessarily establish the existence of such unsoundness as would incapacitate him from making a valid will).
29. Tyrrel v. State, 177 Ind. 14, 97 N.E. 14 (1912) (within Court's
discretion to determine whether or not a child of eight was capable of testifying); Eckman v. Funderberg, 183 Ind. 208, 108 N.E.
577 (1915) (within Court's discretion to determine whether or not
a physician had qualified as an expert). And see 1 Wigmore,
"Evidence" §16 (3d ed. 1940) and 2 id. §561 as to discretion of
the Court generally. North Carolina has adopted the privilege
under discussion in essentially the same form as the New York
statute, n.3 supra, but added a proviso which reads: "Provided,
that the presiding judge of a superior court may compel such disclosure, if in his opinion the same is necessary for a proper administration of justice." N.C. Gen. Stat. (Michie, 1943) §8-53.
Writers have recommended that this provision be adopted in all
jurisdictions where the privilege exists. See 8 Wigmore, "Evidence"
§2380a (3d ed. 1940).
30. To reinstate the rule of the Kern case, supra n.25, it would probably be necessary to overrule the Brackney case, supra n.27 and
perhaps also the cases which have followed it-Towles v. McCurdy, supra n.1, Pence v. Myers, supra n.17, and the instant
case. It is submitted that these cases are wrong on principle, and
that the Courts can properly take such action. Appropriate legislation is also recommended.

